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1. INTRODUCTION
Advocates of fair value accounting believe that fair values
provide more relevant measures of assets, liabilities, and
earnings than do historical costs. These advocates assert
that fair value accounting better reflects underlying eco-
nomic values. The advantages of this method—and the
corresponding weaknesses of historical cost accounting—
are described in more detail in “Accounting for Financial
Assets and Financial Liabilities,” a discussion paper pub-
lished by the International Accounting Standards Commit-
tee (IASC) in March 1997. The IASC requires that all
assets and liabilities be recognized at fair value. Under fair
value accounting, changes in fair values (that is, unrealized
holding gains and losses) are recognized in current earn-
ings. In contrast, under historical cost accounting, changes
in fair values are not recognized until realized.
Even though the fair value accounting debate
relates to all entities and all assets and liabilities, the focus
has been on banks’ securities. In the United States, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 115,
“Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity
Securities,” in May 1993. The FASB intended this standard
to encourage banks to recognize at fair value more invest-
ment securities than before. In Japan, fair value accounting
was introduced for the trading accounts of banks’ securities
in April 1997, but investment accounts for banks’ securi-
ties have not yet been recognized at fair value. The concept
of fair value accounting has also been partly adopted in reg-
ulatory capital requirements based on the 1988 Basle
Accord. In this framework, unrealized profits of invest-
ment securities can be included only in the numerator of
the capital-to-assets ratio used to assess capital adequacy.
However, some fair value accounting critics are
concerned that the precipitous adoption of market value
accounting will have adverse effects on both banks and the
financial system as a whole. In particular, these critics
believe that earnings based on fair values for investment
securities are likely to be more volatile than those based on
historical cost. They assert that this increased volatility
does not reflect the underlying economic volatility of
banks’ operations and that investors will demand an exces-
sive premium, therefore causing investors to allocate funds
inefficiently.
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Critics also assert that using fair value accounting
for investment securities is likely to cause banks to violate
regulatory capital requirements more often than is eco-
nomically appropriate, resulting in excessive regulatory
intervention or in costly actions to reduce the risk of regula-
tory intervention. Actually, regulatory capital requirements
based on the 1988 Basle Accord may have strongly influ-
enced Japanese banks’ lending behavior after the bubble
period. Following that period, Japanese banks experienced a
sharp reduction in unrealized gains from equities. This may
have led banks to adopt overly cautious lending behaviors
to reduce the risk of regulatory intervention.
Using data on U.S. banks, Barth, Landsman, and
Wahlen (1995) have investigated the empirical validity of
the above-mentioned concerns about fair value accounting.
They found no convincing evidence to justify these
concerns. Specifically, Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen found:
• Fair-value-based earnings are more volatile than
historical cost earnings, but share prices do not reflect
the incremental volatility. 
• Banks violate regulatory capital requirements more
frequently under fair value than under historical cost
accounting. 
• Fair-value-based violations help predict actual regula-
tory capital violations, but share prices do not reflect
this potential increase in regulatory risk.
In this paper, we describe an empirical study of
fair value accounting, applying to data on Japanese banks
the analytical methods of Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen.
We also discuss a further study of regulatory risk in capi-
tal requirements associated with fair value accounting,
focusing on banks with low Basle capital adequacy ratios.
This is a different approach from that of Barth, Lands-
man, and Wahlen. In the United States, these authors cal-
culated capital ratios on a fair value accounting basis with
unrealized securities profits. Using these figures, they
tested how fair-value-based violations help predict actual
regulatory capital violations and to what extent investors
recognize this potential increased regulatory risk. In this
paper, we investigate, using actual Basle adequacy ratios,
the regulatory risk in capital requirements associated
with fair value accounting. The outline of our study is as
follows: 
• We examine how fair value accounting affects earn-
ings volatility and whether any incremental volatility
is reflected in bank share prices. If this is the case, do
investors view fair value earnings volatility as a better
proxy for economic risk than historical cost earnings
volatility?
• We examine the effect of fair value accounting on the
volatility of regulatory capital ratios and whether any
increase in regulatory risk associated with fair value
accounting is reflected in share prices. (Regulatory
risk is one component of banks’ total economic risk.)
We specifically focus on banks with low Basle capital
adequacy ratios, examining how far the incremental
volatility associated with fair value accounting is
reflected in bank share prices. 
• We seek a better formula for Basle capital adequacy
ratios, using the concept of fair value accounting. Spe-
cifically, we compare the volatility of capital adequacy
ratios, using the current Basle Accord formula (only
capitals are calculated using the unrealized gains of
investment securities), the formula using historical
cost accounting, and the fair value formula (in which
both capitals and assets are calculated using the unre-
alized gains of investment securities).
We find that: 
• Bank earnings based on the fair values of investment
securities are significantly more volatile than earnings
based on historical cost securities gains and losses. 
• However, the assertion that investors generally
demand an excessive premium because of the
increased volatility associated with fair value account-
ing, thereby raising banks’ cost of capital, is not sup-
ported by any strong empirical evidence. 
• On those critical occasions, when investors value low-
capital-ratio banks’ shares, the volatility in fair value
earnings incremental to that in historical cost earn-
ings is also priced as risk. The choice of accounting
formula adopted in regulatory capital requirements is
therefore very important. 
• The Basle capital adequacy formula adopts (some-
what) the concept of fair value accounting because
the formula allows the inclusion of unrealized gains
of investment securities in the calculation of capi-
tal (the numerator). However, when including suchFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 35
unrealized gains, they should also be used in the
calculation of assets (the denominator). From the
practical point of view, this assertion is also supported
by the fact that the fair value formula (both capital
and assets are calculated using the unrealized gains of
investment securities) is less volatile than the current
formula.
The remainder of this paper is organized as fol-
lows: section 2 describes our data and sample banks.
sections 3 and 4 present our empirical findings related to
earnings volatility and regulatory risk associated with fair
value accounting. In section 5, we seek a better formula for
Basle Accord capital adequacy ratios using fair value
accounting. Section 6 concludes our discussion.
2. DATA AND SAMPLE BANKS
The sample comprises annual data from fiscal year (FY)
1989-FY1996 for eighty-seven Japanese banks that more
than once during this period adopted capital adequacy
ratios based on the 1988 Basle Accord. Our estimation
includes banks that, because of their fragile financial condi-
tion, have adopted Basle capital adequacy ratios only dur-
ing a limited period. However, banks that defaulted during
the period are excluded (even though these banks’ property
has been handed over to other banks).
We focus in this study on listed investment securi-
ties, because only unrealized gains for listed securities are
calculated in capital adequacy ratios based on the 1988
Basle Accord.1 These estimates are obtained from annual
statements of accounts. We can estimate annual fair value
profits and losses of investment securities during the
FY1989-FY1996 period, using data from annual state-
ments of accounts in which unrealized gains and losses for
listed securities data are disclosed since FY1990 and unre-
alized securities gains calculated in Basle Accord capital
adequacy ratios are disclosed since FY1989.
3. EARNINGS VOLATILITY
Here we address two specific questions: 
• Are earnings more volatile using fair value accounting
for investments rather than using historical cost? 
• If earnings are more volatile, do investors perceive
this increased volatility as an additional risk premium
and do banks’ share prices reflect such a premium? 
This will be the case if volatility in earnings based
on fair values for investment securities is a better proxy for
economic risk than that based on historical cost.
3.1. EMPIRICAL MEASURES OF EARNINGS VOLATILITY
Table 1 presents cross-sectional descriptive statistics of
earnings under historical cost and fair value accounting
and realized and unrealized securities gains and losses
using a sample of eighty-seven Japanese banks over the
1989-96 period. The four earnings variables are historical
cost earnings (HCE—that is, ordinary income), HCE
plus unrealized annual gains and losses for investment
securities (that is, fair value earnings, or FVE), realized
securities gains and losses (RSGL), and unrealized securi-
ties gains and losses (URSGL). Realized investment secu-
rities gains and losses are recognized under historical cost
accounting. Under fair value accounting, banks recognize
as investment securities gains and losses that are the sum
of RSGL and URSGL.2
Obviously, URSGL is more volatile than RSGL.
The effect of unrealized securities gains and losses on
ordinary income in any given year can be large. Table 1
shows the standard deviations over the 1989-96 period,
measured for the cross-sectional mean in fair value earnings
Table 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS: EARNINGS VARIABLES
HCE FVE RSGL URSGL
Year N Mean s Mean s Mean s Mean s
89 87 105.1 157.8 -207.1 333.0 25.5 62.3 -312.2 457.7
90 87 97.5 146.3 -104.5 238.3 43.1 101.5 -202.0 332.6
91 87 82.5 124.6 -212.9 565.9 0.4 43.6 -295.3 623.4
92 87 83.9 133.2 107.6 320.4 5.7 54.1 23.7 261.3
93 87 67.8 116.6 146.1 226.5 30.1 70.0 78.3 143.7
94 87 74.9 144.8 -129.4 315.8 16.2 98.8 -204.3 333.0
95 87 26.0 156.0 197.1 360.3 86.2 161.0 171.2 250.1




70.5 -46.8 26.5 -117.3
29.8 168.8 28.2 182.2
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and in historical cost earnings. The former (  of mean:
168.8) is more than five times greater than the latter (  of
mean: 29.8).
3.2. EARNINGS VARIABILITY AND SHARE PRICES
The increased earnings volatility associated with fair
value accounting for investment securities documented in
Table 1 raises the question: Does the market perceive this
increased volatility as additional risk? 
To address this question, we estimate the follow-
ing relationship:
(1)     
where P is the bank’s end-of-fiscal-year share price,3 PREE
is earnings per share before securities gains and losses, and i
and t represent banks and years, respectively.   and
 are the standard deviations of historical cost and fair
value earnings per share for each bank measured over the
recent four years. Because   and   are computed
using four years of data, this analysis extends only from
FY1992 through FY1996.4
However, this estimation period covers the entire
duration of the Basle capital adequacy ratios, excluding the
trial period. Using this estimation, we can investigate the
regulatory risk associated with fair value accounting in
accordance with the Basle Accord of 1988. We deal with
this in section 4. Equation 1 is based on a valuation model
where price is determined as earnings divided by the cost
of equity capital. The model assumes that a firm’s equity
value equals an earnings multiple times permanent earn-
ings, where risk is one of many determinants of the earn-
ings multiple. The earnings multiple is assumed to be
negatively related to risk (see appendix).
Equation 1 permits the coefficient on earnings to
vary with two risk proxies based on earnings variability. If
historical cost accounting earnings and their variance are
good proxies for permanent earnings and risk, then the
expected sign of   is negative. Because we are trying to
determine whether the market perceives the variance asso-
ciated with fair value accounting as risk incremental to his-
torical cost earnings variance, our test is whether 
s
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equals zero. Finding that   is significantly different from
zero is consistent with any difference between fair value
and historical cost earnings variance being perceived by the
market as risk.
Note that the sign of   depends on the sign of the
difference between   and  . Because Table 1 reports
that the variance of fair value earnings,  , exceeds the
variance of historical cost earnings,  , we expect the sign
of   to be negative. To be consistent with the going-
concern assumption in the underlying valuation model, we
eliminate observations with negative earnings, PREE.
Table 2 presents regression estimates (N=302)
using a fixed-effects estimation of eighty-seven banks. It
describes estimations of three fixed-effects models that
pool observations across years (FY1992-FY1996). Panel
A contains the regression summary statistics for equation
1. Panels B and C present regression summary statistics
from estimating versions of equation 1 that include either
the volatility of historical cost earnings or fair value earn-
ings, each interacting with earnings before securities
gains and losses, but not both.
Panel A indicates that volatility in fair value
earnings is not associated with a reduced earnings mul-
tiple assigned by investors. The coefficient on
,  , is insignificantly different
from zero ( 0.40), indicating that the volatility in fair
value earnings incremental to that in historical cost earn-
ings is not priced as risk.
The findings in Panel A are inconsistent with fair
value accounting critics’ assertions that increased volatility
associated with fair value earnings directly affects investors’
capital allocation decisions. The findings are consistent
with investors who perceive that volatility in historical cost
earnings is a better measure of economic risk than volatility
in fair value earnings. The fact that bank share prices do not
reflect the incremental volatility of fair value earnings is
consistent with the findings using U.S. bank data over the
1976-90 period in Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen (1995).
To eliminate collinearity between the two volatility
measures, we also estimate each measure alone. Panels B and
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Table 2
REGRESSION ESTIMATES FROM FIXED-EFFECTS ESTIMATION
Panel A
Coefficient estimates: 
   F-test: F (82,216) = 78.646, P-value = [.0000]





       F-test: F (82,217) = 87.120, P-value = [.0000]
 
   Hausman-test: CHSQ(2) = 107.33, P-value = [.0000]




   F-test: F (82,217) = 74.363, P-value = [.0000]
  Hausman-test: CHISQ(2) = 145.78, P-value = [.0000]
Notes: P is price per share; PREE is earnings per share before securities gains and losses;   is the standard deviation of historical cost earnings per share for each bank 
measured over the most recent four years;   is the standard deviation of fair value earnings per share, calculated as historical cost earnings plus unrealized gains and 
losses for investment securities for each bank measured over the most recent four years; i is bank i; t is year t.
Pit a0i a0t a1PREEit a2 sHCit PREEit ´ () a 3 sFVit sHCit – () PREEit eit + ´ + + ++ =
a1 1.40 t 3.55 = () =
a2 0.01 – t 4.13 – = () =
a3 0.0002 t 0.40 = () =
P it a0i a0t a1PREEit a2 sHCit PREEit ´ () e it + + ++ =
a1 1.47 t 4.11 = () =
a2 0.01 – t 4.47 – = () =
P it a0i a0t a1PREEit a2 sFVit PREEit ´ () e it + + ++ =
a1 1.07 t 2.69 = () =
a2 0.0007 – t 2.07 – = () =
sHC
sFV
effect on the earnings multiple. The coefficients represent-
ing the effect of historical cost earnings volatility and fair
value earnings volatility on the earnings multiple are sig-
nificantly negative, with t-statistics of -4.47 and -2.07,
respectively. Both volatility measures are therefore proxies
for risk. But our findings in Panel A indicate that histori-
cal cost volatility dominates fair value earnings volatility as
a risk proxy. 
4. REGULATORY RISK 
4.1. A COMPARISON OF REGULATORY 
CAPITAL MEASURES
Based on the findings in Table 1, we expect regulatory cap-
ital ratios based on fair value accounting to be more vola-
tile than those based on historical cost. This may also be
true of Basle adequacy ratios, which, in part, adopt the con-
cept of fair value accounting for investment securities.
Table 3 shows a comparison of volatility between current
Basle capital adequacy ratios and capital adequacy ratios
Table 3
COMPARISON OF VOLATILITY OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIOS
BIS-R HC-R FV-R
m 9.17 7.33 8.81
s 3.14 2.62 3.02
Notes: 
BIS-R is the mean of the mean and the standard deviation measured for each bank 
over the period FY1989-FY1996, using current Basle capital adequacy ratios 
(only capital is calculated with unrealized gains of investment securities).
HC-R is the mean of the mean and the standard deviation measured for each bank 
over the period FY1989-FY1996, using capital ratios based on historical cost 
accounting.
FV-R is the mean of the mean and the standard deviation measured for each bank 
over the period FY1989-FY1996, using capital ratios based on fair value account-
ing (both capital and assets are calculated with unrealized gains of investment 
securities).
calculated without unrealized profits for investment securi-
ties. Obviously, the former is more volatile than the latter.
In the table, the mean of the mean ( ) and the standard
deviation ( ) are measured for each bank over the period
FY1989-FY1996 using three formulas. These formulas
are: current Basle capital adequacy ratios (only capital is
m
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calculated with unrealized gains from investment securities),
capital ratios based on historical cost accounting, and capital
ratios based on fair value accounting (both capital and assets
are calculated with unrealized gains of investment securi-
ties). The table uses a sample of eighty-seven Japanese
banks over the period FY1989-FY1996. Actually, in Japan
the current Basle capital adequacy formula is sometimes
criticized because the inclusion of unrealized gains of
investment securities in capital (the numerator) intensifies
the volatility of capital adequacy ratios, thus having an
inappropriate impact on bank behavior. 
4.2. REGULATORY RISK AND SHARE PRICES
Now we investigate the pricing effect of regulatory risk by
estimating equation 1 for banks with low Basle capital adequacy
ratios. Banks with low Basle capital adequacy ratios may
have a greater possibility of regulatory capital violations
caused by the volatility of unrealized profits for investment
securities than do banks with high capital adequacy ratios.
If so, fair value earnings volatility is most likely to be
priced incrementally to historical cost earnings volatility
for banks with low Basle capital adequacy ratios. If the fair
value earnings volatility of banks with low capital ade-
quacy ratios is reflected in their share prices, investors
should recognize the regulatory risk associated with fair
value accounting.
Table 4 presents Basle capital adequacy ratio levels
and the number of banks having those levels. We focus on
banks with low capital adequacy ratios (under 9.0 percent).
Table 5 provides estimates of the relationships between
bank share prices and earnings before securities gains and
losses, volatility in reported earnings, and volatility in fair
value earnings. Regression estimates are from fixed-effects
estimation. The sample represents Japanese banks with low
capital adequacy ratios (under 9.0 percent) during the
1992-96 period. The table reveals that the coefficients’
effects on the earnings multiple are significantly nega-
tive (with t-statistics of -3.01 and -3.37), even though
the historical cost earnings coefficient is larger than that of
the fair value earnings coefficient. So, for banks with low
capital adequacy ratios,5 both volatilities are reflected in
bank share prices. This finding indicates that investors rec-
ognize the regulatory risk associated with fair value
accounting.6 In this sense, we cannot reject the possibility
of increased volatility having some impact on capital allo-
cation decisions and bank behavior. If this is the case, does
it mean that regulatory capital requirements using fair
value accounting are irrelevant? We deal with this issue in
the next section.
5. APPROPRIATE ACCOUNTING FORMULA 
FOR CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIOS 
In section 3, we showed that the volatility in fair value
earnings is not generally recognized by investors as a better
risk proxy than that in historical cost earnings. However,
in section 4 we demonstrated that under critical circum-
stances, such as the valuation of low-capital-ratio banks’
shares, the volatility in fair value earnings incremental to
that in historical cost earnings is also priced as risk. 
We interpret these findings as follows: 
• No strong empirical evidence supports the assertion
that investors generally demand an excessive pre-
mium because of the increased volatility associated
with fair value accounting, therefore raising banks’
cost of capital. 
• However, this does not mean that fair value earnings
are value-irrelevant. In fact, on those critical occasions
when investors value low-capital-ratio banks’ shares,
fair value earnings provide us with more useful infor-
mation than do historical cost earnings.
Table 4
BANKS’ BASLE CAPITAL ADEQUACY RATIO LEVELS 
1992-96
BIS-R (Percent) 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
9.00 ~ 59 70 50 59 61
8.75~9.00 15 8 12 8 6
8.50~8.75 12 8 13 7 3
8.25~8.50 1 1 9 9 8
8.00~8.25 0 0 1 1 2
7.75~8.00 0 0 0 0 0
7.50~7.75 0 0 0 0 0
7.25~7.50 0 0 0 0 0
7.00~7.25 0 0 0 0 0
~ 7.00 0 0 1 0 1
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• We can interpret as regulatory risk associated with
fair value accounting the perceived volatility in fair
value earnings incremental to that in historical cost
earnings in the valuation of low-capital-ratio banks’
shares. 
Examined from a different angle, our findings
indicate that the choice of accounting formula adopted in
regulatory capital requirements is very important. If an
inappropriate accounting formula is adopted, there is a
possibility that the regulatory capital requirements mis-
lead investors and lead to inefficient capital allocation deci-
sions and inappropriate bank behavior.
We now ask, how relevant is the current account-
ing formula used to calculate capital requirements under
the terms of the 1988 Basle Accord? This question should
be addressed in terms of the purpose of the bank capital
standards. Broadly speaking, bank capital standards are
aimed at limiting bank failures by decreasing the likeli-
hood of bank insolvency (that is, decreasing the likelihood
that banks have negative economic net worth, in which lia-
bilities exceed assets). Therefore, banks’ capital ratios
should be a good indication of the future probability of
banks’ negative net worth. When we assess the future
probability of banks’ negative net worth, both assets and
liabilities should be fair-valued, reflecting future risk factors.
Capital ratios based on historical cost cannot accu-
rately indicate economic net worth. In some cases, failed
institutions report positive net worth in excess of regula-
tory requirements under historical cost accounting, even
though these institutions already have negative economic
net worth. We can therefore consider relevant regulatory
capital requirements using fair value accounting since
these formulas lead regulators to address institutions’
financial difficulties earlier.
So, what is “fair value” in the context of capital
adequacy ratios? Theoretically, we consider valid the asser-
tion that all assets and liabilities should be calculated using
fair value (taking into account fluctuations in value from
various risk factors, such as market risk, credit risk, and
liquidity risk). However, we find it difficult, realistically,
to use fair value accounting on all assets and liabilities to
calculate capital adequacy ratios. We have much to explore
on this matter. 
In this paper, we do not deal with general risk fac-
tors or fair value accounting associated with Basle capital
adequacy ratios. Our study provides evidence to support
the assertion that inappropriate or incorrect fair values
adopted in regulatory capital requirements should be
revised, because of the possibility that they will cause inef-
ficient capital allocations by investors and inappropriate
bank behavior. From this point of view, the current Basle
capital adequacy formula allows biased treatment, at least
theoretically, of the calculation of unrealized gains from
investment securities.7 The current formula includes unre-
alized gains of investment securities only in the calculation
of capital (the numerator), but assets (the denominator)
should also be calculated to include unrealized gains from
investment securities.
This is not only justified by theoretical argu-
ments. Practically, this assertion is appropriate, because
Table 5
REGRESSION ESTIMATES, SAMPLE OF LOW-CAPITAL-RATIO BANKS
Coefficient estimates: 
   F-test:  F (31,39) = 30.472, P-value = [.0000]
   Hausman-test:  CHISQ(3) = 23.260, P-value = [.0000]
  
Notes: P is price per share; PREE is earnings per share before securities gains and losses;   is the standard deviation of historical cost earnings per share for each bank 
measured over the most recent four years;   is the standard deviation of fair value earnings per share, calculated as historical cost earnings plus unrealized gains and 
losses for investment securities for each bank measured over the most recent four years; i is bank i; t is year t; t-statistics are in parentheses.
Pit a0i a0t a1PREEit a2 sHCit PREEit ´ () a 3 sFVit sHCit – () PREEit eit + ´ + + ++ =
a1 8.43 t 5.33 = () =
a2 0.02 – t 3.01 – = () =
a3 0.008 – t 3.37 – = () =
sHC
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this alternative formula (that is, calculating unrealized
gains of investment securities for denominators, as well as
numerators) mitigates capital adequacy ratios’ volatility.
Table 3 shows a comparison of the volatility of capital
adequacy ratios using the current Basle Accord formula
(only capital is calculated using the unrealized gains from
investment securities), the formula using historical cost
accounting, and fair value formulas (both capital and
assets are calculated using the unrealized gains of invest-
ment securities). Under the fair value formula, 45 percent
of the unrealized gains of investment securities is
included in capital (the numerator), which follows the
treatment under the current formula, taking into account
the concept of tax effect accounting.8 However, assets
include 100 percent of unrealized gains of investment
securities. This treatment is relevant because, under tax
effect accounting, profits can be adjusted but the asset side
remains unchanged. Obviously, the current and fair value
formulas are more volatile than the historical cost formula,
but between the two former formulas, the fair value for-
mula—calculating unrealized gains from investment
securities—mitigates the increased volatility.
In Japan, the current Basle capital adequacy for-
mula is sometimes criticized because it includes unrealized
gains of investment securities in capital (the numerator),
intensifying the capital adequacy ratios’ volatility and
therefore having an inappropriate impact on bank behavior.
The findings in Table 3 show that, even from the critics’
point of view, the fair value formula (calculating both capi-
tal and assets using the unrealized gains from investment
securities) is more appropriate than the current formula.
6. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the assertions of those who criticize
the use of fair value accounting to estimate the value of
investment securities. We studied the regulatory risk asso-
ciated with capital adequacy ratios based on fair value
accounting. We addressed these issues using earnings that
we calculated using disclosed fair value estimates of banks’
investment securities and Basle capital adequacy ratios,
which partly adopt the concept of fair value accounting. 
We reached the following conclusions:
• Although earnings are more volatile under fair value
accounting, this increased volatility does not necessar-
ily represent a proxy of economic risk.
• However, in critical circumstances—where investors
value low-capital-ratio banks’ shares—the volatility
in fair value earnings, incremental to that in historical
cost earnings, is also priced as risk.
Our first conclusion is consistent with the find-
ings of Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen (1995), who use data
on U.S. banks. However, our second conclusion is different
from their empirical results. Presumably, this difference is
brought about partly by differences in regulation and in
bank behavior.
In the United States, banks basically are not
allowed to hold equity securities and the size of these hold-
ings is limited.9 In Japan, however, the size of equity secu-
rities holdings is much larger,10 thus causing volatile
unrealized gains that can be considered to have more
impact than in the United States on investors’ valuation of
banks’ shares under critical circumstances.
Our conclusions suggest the following: 
• The assertion that investors generally demand an
excessive premium because of the increased volatility
associated with fair value accounting, thereby raising
banks’ cost of capital, is not supported by any strong
empirical evidence. 
• However, this does not mean that fair value earnings
are value-irrelevant. In fact, on those critical occasions
when investors value low-capital-ratio banks’ shares,
fair value earnings provide us with more useful infor-
mation than do historical cost earnings. 
• The perceived volatility in fair value earnings incre-
mental to that in historical cost earnings in the valu-
ation of low-capital-ratio banks’ shares can be
interpreted as regulatory risk associated with fair
value accounting and it indicates the importance of
the accounting framework of the Basle capital
adequacy formula. If an inappropriate accounting
formula is adopted, there is a possibility that regula-
tory capital requirements will mislead investors and
lead to inefficient capital allocation decisions andFRBNY ECONOMIC POLICY REVIEW / OCTOBER 1998 41
inappropriate bank behavior. The Basle capital
adequacy formula adopts in part the concept of fair
value accounting in the sense that it allows the inclu-
sion of unrealized gains of investment securities in the
calculation of capital (the numerator). However, when
including unrealized gains, we should also include
those gains in the calculation of assets (the denomi-
nator). This assertion is supported by the fact that
the fair value formula (both capital and assets are
calculated using the unrealized gains of investment
securities) is less volatile than the current formula.
Suppose that the current price of a share is  , that the
expected price at the end of a year is  , and that the
expected dividend per share is  . We assume that the
equity investors invest for both dividends and capital
gains, and that expected return is r.
Our fundamental valuation formula is, therefore,
.
This formula will hold in each period, as well as in
the present. That allowed us to express next year’s forecast
price in terms of the subsequent stream of dividends per
share  ,  . . . . If dividends are expected to grow
forever at a constant rate, g, then
.
We transform this into the following formula,
where  b is the retention rate and   is the current earnings
per share:
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We obtain the relationship that equity value equals an
earnings multiple   times current earnings per share  .
Now, we focus on expected return r. By using the
capital asset pricing model, the following equation is
obtained:
(A2)          ,
where   is the risk free rate,   is the expected return on
the market index, and   is the covariance  .
When we combine equations A1 and A2, we find
the earnings multiple is described in the form
. If we assume that the portion of the earn-
ings multiple attributable to risk can be disaggregated
linearly from the total earnings multiple, then we obtain
equation 1 in the main text. 
q () E0
ri rf bi rm rf – () rf
rsri
srm
---------- rm rf – () + = + =
rf rm
r ri rm , () s risrm ¤
1 AB sri + () ¤
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1. The investment securities holdings of 149 Japanese banks (including
city banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, regional banks, and
regional banks II) on average account for 15.4 percent (in 1996) of their
total assets.
2. Under the current accounting rules in Japan, banks’ investment
securities are recognized at historical cost (equity securities are
recognized at the lower of cost or market) and estimates of their fair
values are disclosed. In this paper, on the assumption that disclosure and
recognition are informationally equivalent, we make fair value estimates
by adding URSGL to RSGL. 
3. Banks’ annual statements cannot be obtained at the end of the fiscal
year. However, investors may infer those figures by evaluating forecast
figures in the semiannual statements, movements of interest rates, the
stock price index (Nikkei Heikin), and other information sources such as
from rating firms. Therefore, a bank’s end-of-fiscal-year share price can
be considered relevant. Incidentally, Barth, Landsman, and Wahlen
(1995) analyze U.S. banks by using end-of-year data—the same type of
information we use to study Japanese banks.
4. The four-year calculation period reflects the tradeoff between having
a sufficient number of observations to estimate the earnings variance
efficiently and having a sufficient number of observations to estimate
efficiently equation 1.
5. When simply conducting the same estimation with regard to high
capital adequacy ratios, the coefficient of earnings per share before
securities gains and losses, as well as that of the increased volatility of
fair value estimates, is insignificant. Presumably, this result is driven
somewhat by the large-scale loan writeoffs in the recent years: In this
situation, high earnings are not necessarily positively valued, because
myopic behavior, such as reporting high profits in the short run while
deferring the writeoffs of nonperforming loans, is negatively valued.
Mainly large banks, such as city banks that have relatively high capital
ratios, have conducted the large-scale writeoffs. At any rate, for this
study we have to conduct the empirical estimation using other financial
data such as the sum of writeoffs and nonperforming loans, which we
think will be the subject of future studies. 
6. The risk investors recognize regarding capital adequacy ratios is not
limited to regulatory risk. Even without regulatory capital requirements,
investors monitor the economic capital ratios of banks and, if these ratios
decrease, they will demand an excessive premium. In this sense, we
cannot easily draw the line between regulatory risk and risk regarding
economic capital ratios. In this paper, we focus on regulatory risk and do
not touch upon such issues as the meaning of capital for shareholders and
managers and the meaning of internal capital allocation.
7. The treatment of unrealized gains from investment securities is left
to each country’s regulator. In Japan, banks are allowed to include
unrealized gains from investment securities. In this paper, we consider
the treatment of unrealized gains in Japan.
8. To be precise, under the current formula, the figure 45 percent is
considered to be determined not only by tax effect accounting, but also
by the fact that not all of unrealized profits can be realized. At any rate,
regarding the inclusion of unrealized gains in the calculation of capital,
we adopt the figure 45 percent in the calculation of the fair value formula
to clarify the comparison with the current formula.
9. “Except as hereinafter provided or otherwise permitted by law,
nothing herein contained shall authorize the purchase by the
association for its own account of any shares of stock of any
corporation.” (Title 12, United States Code Section 24, Seventh.)
10. The investment securities holdings of U.S. commercial banks
(9,528) on average account for 17.5 percent of total assets (in 1996),
which is larger than the amount for Japanese banks (15.4 percent).
However, the size of banks’ equity securities accounts for only 2.7 percent
of total holding securities, while that of Japanese banks accounts for
34.7 percent of total holding securities.REFERENCES
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